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ABSTRACT 
Two major safety-critical elements of the onboard software for the Tejas digital flight control 
computer software are the control laws and the airdata algorithm. The airdata algorithm computes 
essential parameters like static and dynamic pressures, altitude, speed, angle of attack, etc from 
the airdata sensor input. These parameters are used by the control laws to stabilise the aircraft 
and to provide the required uniform handling qualities over the complete flight envelope. The 
algorithm is provided by the Control Law Design Team and coded by the Software Design Group 
of Software House, ADA, Bangalore, in Ada language. The Independent Verification and Validation 
Group is responsible for ensuring that the software is bug-free and certifiable. A non-real time 
(NRT) test methodology has been developed in-house to stress test the onboard software. This 
paper gives an overview of the methodology used to carry out the NRT test of the airdata 
algorithm and some of the testing experiences. 
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1. INTRODUCTION passed preliminary unit-level and integration-level 
The non-real time (NRT) test methodology 
developed at the Aeronautical Development Agency, 
Bangalore, for testing safety-critical software' in 
1998 has matured over the years2". A randomised 
way of generating test cases has been developed 
to remove some of the drawbacks of manually- 
tests have been trapped. Some defects have even 
passed through system- level tests at the Ironbird 
Facility. This paper consolidates the Software Testing 
Group's experience in ensuring software quality 
using NRT test methodology. A few interesting 
catastrophic defects have been analysed in this paper. 
generated test cases4. The method has been used The airdata algorithm is briefly presented to 
to test various builds of the digital flight control familiarise about the system under test. A description 
computer (DFCC) software. The Software Testing of the NRT test methodology is provided for 
Group at the Aeronautical Development Agency completeness. A few category 1 (catastrophic) defects 
(ADA), Bangalore has gained vast experience in have been presented and the nature of the defects 
testing of the software using NRT test methodology has been discussed providing an insight into the 
over the years. The software defects, which have power of NRT test methodology in trapping these 
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defects. The causes of the defects and the ways 
these could have been avoided or trapped earlier, 
are also discussed. Finally, the best practices gleaned 
from the test activity are listed here. 
2 .  AIRDATA ALGORITHM 
Modern day aircraft with fly-by-wire flight control 
systems require information regarding altitude, speed, 
angle of attack, and sideslip to ensure stability and 
good handling during the entire flight envelopes. 
These parameters were measured by pressure probes 
and conventional instruments in earlier aircraft. 
Today, the same sensor output are digitised and used 
with sophisticated algorithm to provide a redundant 
source of information required for feedback in the 
safety-critical control laws. 
The light combat aircraft, Tejas has three pressure 
probes, a temperature probe, and two angle of 
attack vanes to measure the required parameters. 
The pressures were converted to electrical signals 
and transmitted to the four-channel digital flight 
control computer (DFCC) by RS422 links. Vane 
and probe de-icing heaters were also monitored for 
their health. Failure of heaters could cause icing of 
the probes and vanes, making their measurements 
invalid. Since the sensor failures could cause mistrack, 
so the faulty sensors were voted out. Multiple 
failures could cause certain events to be set in the 
control law to facilitate reversionary backup control 
laws to be brought into action. The airdata algorithm 
output are also sent for display on the head-up- 
display and on the get-U-home panel for information 
to the pilot. This information is not safety-critical 
and a single working sensor can provide the required 
information. Figure 1 shows the schematic of the 
airdata system used in the Tejas aircraft. 
The airdata algorithm was designed by the 
National Control Law Design Team (NCT), and 
was coded by the Software House, in Ada language. 
The Software Design Group of ADA provides a 
functionality document, a detailed block diagram, 
and a functional code for the test case and expected 
result generation. The Independent Verification and 
Validation (IV&V) Group and the Software Design 
Group together tested the safety-critical code using 
the NRT test methodology. 
3 .  NON-REAL TIME TESTING 
The NRT test methodology tests the 4-channel 
DFCC code in a single-strand mode on a target 
Figure 1. Schematic of airdata system 
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hardware board. The target hardware board is a 
single-board computer with the same processor as 
the 4-channel DFCC. The single-strand code is 
compiled after clipping and stubbing with the same 
options as the final software build. The executable 
is run on the single-board computer and the output 
compared with the design code. A defect in the 
software is certain if the error between the two 
is greater than a specified threshold (0.02 %). 
4 .  SOFTWARE DEFECTS 
Various builds of the DFCC codes have been 
tested since 1998. Several software defects (category 
1) have been detected during the tests. Errors (category 
1) can cause catastrophic failures of the safety- 
critical code. These defects have been isolated by 
debugging and testing the safety-critical code. The 
Software House has rectified the safety-critical 
code and cleared the software for the flight. A few 
of these defects are discussed here. The lessons 
learned in software quality assurance are given as 
a moral of the test story. 
4.1 Index Exceedance 
The airdata algorithm has several look-up tables 
to compute the various parameters. In the total 
temperature measurement component, there is a 
table to compute the correction factor based on 
the Mach number. If the Mach number is >1.0 and 
1 2.0, then the correction has to be applied. The 
correction factor is provided as a look-up table wrt 
Mach number. 
This interpolation algorithm design defect should 
have been trapped at the unit-level testing itself. 
However, this was not done because s f  the inadequacy 
of the unit-level test cases to check the boundary 
values. Another important issue was, during testing 
phase, the compiler option, 'suppress run-time checks' 
was set. So, even if the boundary checks were 
performed and if the error was within the tolerance 
bounds specified for the test, then the bug in the 
safety-critical code would not have been noticed. 
Test Moral 
Always check for (i) the exact boundary values 
of the variables, (ii) greater than the boundary 
value of the variable, and (iii) less than the boundary 
value of the variable during unit-level testing. Stress 
testing software is necessary during functional and 
integration-level tests. Dynamic input like high amplitude 
sine waves used in the NRT test methodology 
could cause a system failure and trap the defect. 
During the testing phase, the run-time checks need 
not be suppressed as otherwise problems like this 
may go unnoticed. 
* Wrong indexing is a very common mistake made very 
often-look out for this. Bugs can hide anywhere, but 
these are always present behind the kitchen sink! 
4.2 Incorrect Indexing 
The total temperature computation block has 
two correction factors. One correction is for the 
de-icing heater error (DHE) and the other for the 
During NRT test methodology stress testing self-heating error (SHE). Both the correction factors 
Mach number was varied from -1.0 to 3.0 as a are provided as look-up tables DHE-TAB and 
sine waveform and the output monitored. It was SHE-TAB wrt a variable Z. In the algorithm in 
found that with the increase in Mach number from Ada the index was for the 
2.0 and above, the execution terminated with range- DHE look-up table. As the Z values used for SHE 
constraint error. Examination of the safetv-critical and DHE were the the index for 
code indicated that for a Mach number value of 
2.0, the computed array index exceeded the defined 
size of the array. 
It should be noted that the 4-channel DFCC 
code is normally compiled with the options to suppress 
the run-time check. In this case, the execution 
would not terminate and would continue with the 
some junk value assumed for the variable. 
DHE was used for SHE also. However, there was 
a condition of heater failure where DHE index 
was not computed at all but the SHE correction 
was required. 
During NRT tests, a varying Z value with 
random toggling of the heater flag was used in the 
test case. This caused a mismatch between the 
designer- provided model code and the Ada safety- 
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critical code. Debugging the code brought out the 
following software design defect: 
As the Z index was computed during the DHE 
computation and used for the SHE interpolation, 
during heater failure, the index was not computed 
and SHE computation was erroneous. 
Test Moral 
An independent model code, as a reference 
for the expected result, is very essential to benchmark 
a safety-critical code. Random toggling of events1 
flags gives a good way of shaking down a piece 
of code. Randomness in test signals mimics the 
natural manner in which the flags are set. Special 
care should be taken when designing software, 
especially when an advantage is foreseen in cutting 
down code and optimising. The solution may not 
be an ideal one in terms of functionality. 
* Stress test with random signals-this is a very cheap and 
efficient way of testing a code. 
4.3 Inaccuracies in Table Compression 
The look-up table of the algorithm takes up too 
much memory space. An optimisation was carried 
out by packing three numbers together. The Software 
Design Group of ADA provided an algorithm for 
this. During NRT testing, it was found that the 
errors between the packed table data and the tables 
in the functionality document were more than expected. 
An analysis of the data-packing algorithm brought 
out the fact that the Software House had used FIX 
(extract only the integer value) instead of ROUND 
(round off to the nearest integer) to compute the 
packed table. This error, though small, caused an 
increase in errors in the computed parameters due 
to the presence of a multiplication factor. 
Test Moral 
As a tester of the system (not just the software), 
it pays to check algorithm design also. NRT test 
methodology provides a digital platform, where such 
small errors can be trapped. This cannot be done 
with the actual hardware like AID converters present, 
as their noise would mask the test accuracies. 
* Broaden the test scope without compromising test schedules. 
4.4 Missing Requirements 
During flight, it was found that the airdata 
parameters were a function of the aircraft 
undercarriage operation. A detailed post-flight 
analysis was carried out and the algorithm modified 
to cater for this. This change was reflected in the 
functionality document released for coding. However, 
the final code released for testing did not have this 
correction. The effect of the change was small but 
necessary. System- Ievel testing cleared the software 
for flight. 
NRT testing revealed the defect in the software. 
This was due to the dynamic nature of the testing 
and the very tight error bands involved in the testing. 
Test Moral 
Changes made to the design should be highlighted 
and mentioned separately. The Software Design 
Group of ADA should take special care to see 
that the design modifications are understood 
and coded. A meeting with the Coding team and 
Independent Varification and Validation (IV&V) 
Group highlighting the changes would have prepared 
both for the additional testing. 
The unit-level test cases also used similar code 
design and were perhaps made by the same group. 
Independent check by a separate group is essential 
to check the software. In places where there is 
manpower shortage, software coder from another 
group could be used to check the software by 
interchanging their work. System-level tests are 
not meant for stress-testing software. These are 
useful for demonstration of system performance. 
It is very essential that system design personnel be 
involved in testing. This synergy leads to better 
software quality! 
* Involve the system designers and software designers in 
test activity. The combination works very well. 
4.5 Cut-paste Errors 
The Software House reported errors in the 
altitude (a derived parameter) during its software 
integration tests (SIT), which were very high. The 
explanation given by them was that the errors were 
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due to the approximations in the look-up table due 4.6 Uninitialised Variable 
to packing.-~he Software Design ~ r o J ~  checked 
this with the maximum errors in the tables due to 
packing and for various flight conditions. It was 
found that errors due to packing were much smaller 
than what was encountered during software integration 
tests (SIT). Meanwhile, another group, which was 
looking up at the compiled object code, reported 
an error but was unable to trace the source of the 
errors. 
NRT testing of the software with large amplitude 
signals, for stress testing the code and tapping of 
intermediate variables, could isolate the error to a 
specific function. A code walkthrough of the function 
revealed that a two-dimensional interpolation routine 
was sending the same variable for the X and Y 
variables instead of sending two separate variables. 
This is seen in the code example given below. As 
the other variable was not being used, the optimising 
compiler had removed that portion of the code as 
the dead code. This was the error noticed in the 
object code analysis. 
Test Moral 
The causes for the defect in the software 
were attributed to the cut-paste technique used 
while writing code, and the inadequate unit-level 
testing. 
It is often seen during testing that the errors 
exist in a visible variable but the cause lies somewhere 
else. Stress testing is very essential for any safety- 
critical code. Tapping of intermediate variables 
gives an excellent view into the working of the 
software and it is very easy to debug the code. 
The price paid for tapping out the additional parameters 
is the slowing down of the test activity. However, 
automatic testing and logging of the results and 
errors can overcome this deficit in testing. As 
experienced, if the test cases are partitioned to 
test specific blocks, and if all the input to the block 
and output of the block under test are tapped, it 
pays rich dividends in terms of time saved in debugging 
and isolation of the problems. 
* If the output is not what was expected, it is most likely 
to be because of a bug. 
Initialisation part of the code is the most difficult 
to test. There are many variables and many values 
these can take. An uninitialised variable is detected 
by observing the first frame of data. In case of 
filters and integrator, an uninitialised variable will 
show its effect in the subsequent frames. Random 
tests with initial conditions randomly selected, can 
check for such situations. The following code shows 
the initialisation phase and the main code segments. 
This error was captured as an error visible only 
in the first frame. The code was later corrected 
by adding the code segment below. 
Test Moral 
A set of test cases can be generated for testing 
only the initialisation part. The test cases generated 
randomly can be executed for a few frames (say 
10 major cycles) to test the initialisation part 
automatically. Any error in the first few frames is 
definitely due to an error in the initialisation. 
* There is always an error in the zeroth frame! 
5; BEST PRACTICES 
The experiences gained in the test activity are 
summarised as best practices in the requirements 
phase, software coding phase, and the testing phase. 
5.1 Requirements Phase 
A systematic approach to requirements capture 
is required. The practice followed some Tejas 
is that the Software Design Group of ADA gives 
the requirements in the form of a functionality 
document. It has been observed that the Software 
House usually misinterprets the requirements. A 
simulink block diagram and model is provided by 
the Software Design Group of ADA to the Software 
House. Problems have been attributed to the 
Software House not understanding the simulink 
blocks. Following steps may be taken during the 
requirements phase: 
An interaction between the Software Design 
Group and the Software House is a must for 
proper requirements capture. 
DEF SCI J, VOL. 56, NO. 1, JANUARY 2006 
Automated requirements management tools can 6. CONCLUSION 
help remove some of the misunderstanding by 
giving a text-alone requirement. The simulink 
blocks can be integrated with the requirements 
for better understanding. 
It is seen that Software House makes changes 
in the safety-critical code for optirnising performance. 
These changes should be ratified with the Software 
Design Group for their effect on functionality. 
Working of these two groups in isolation is 
harmful as defects are trapped very late in the 
project. 
5.2 Coding Phase 
Non-real time (NRT) testing has provided a 
rich experience in ensuring software quality. The 
concept of a single-strand testing, the digital 
mode of testing with tight error tolerance bands, 
and stress testing of the safety-critical code in an 
end-to-end manner with tapped out intermediate 
variables, has trapped a number of safety-critical 
(category-1) errors. A few of these are mentioned 
with the lesson learnt in the process. 
The test morals provide a few best practices 
for testing and ensuring quality of safety-critical 
software. These are: 
Automatic code generators could reduce some Common software coding errors will always be 
of the errors found in the safety-critical software. present. These may be looked for in particular. 
A separate group should carry out extensive 
unit-level tests, preferably using some of the 
automated tools for checking dead code. 
5.3 Testing Phase 
The success of NRT test methodology can be , 
mainly attributed to interaction between the 
Independent Verification and Validation Group 
and the Software Design Group. 
There is, however, minimal interaction with the 
Software House. Involvement of the Software 
House in the testing could sort out certain 
misunderstanding. 
Test case should be generated to test the system 
in an end-to-end manner. 
Stress testing is essential for any safety-critical 
software. 
Testing software is not a routine affair. Testers 
play a very important role in the software 
development phase. They should be trained in 
the latest technologies available. 
Management should consider testing as essential 
and not a hindrance to the project schedule. 
Proper management of project schedules, with 
adequate time frames provided for testing, can 
produce high quality certifiable software. 
Stress test with random signals is a very cheap 
and efficient way of testing safety-criticcal code. 
Be very specific about the scope of the test. 
It is futile to go on testing the code. But, try 
and broaden the test scope without compromising 
test schedules. 
Start the test activity very early. Involve the 
system designers and software designers in the 
test activity from the very beginning. 
If the output is not what was being expected, 
it isvery likely to be because of a bug. There 
could be other explanations but in 99 per cent 
of the cases, it will be an error-look for it. 
There is always an error in the zeroth frame. 
Initialisation errors are very common. Random 
test cases are very effective in trapping such 
errors. 
A well-trained test team is an asset to the 
organisation involved in safety-critical software 
development. The future of software development 
is formal methods, which purport to do away with 
software testing completely. But it is essential to 
remember-to err is human. 
* Testing software is inevitable for ensuring quality in any 
safety-critical software. 
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